When small talk becomes a security risk

HUMINT, or human intelligence, can begin with an entirely ordinary conversation. It may be an encounter at a conference, a new LinkedIn connection or a coffee meeting with someone who seems interested in your work. During the conversation, they ask about your work, your projects or the people around you. Individually, the questions may not seem unusual. Together, however, they may create a potential information security risk.

Anders Spalding, HiQ’s Director of National Security and Protective Security and a former intelligence officer at Sweden’s Military Intelligence and Security Service, MUST, explains how HUMINT works in practice in an episode of the Spionpodden podcast.

Modern espionage rarely looks like it does in films

Espionage often brings to mind secret documents, encrypted messages and meetings in dark alleyways. The reality is often far more ordinary. Information is collected in everyday conversations, industry events, business travel and online. Professionals exchange experiences and build relationships. At the same time, we talk about our work, our projects, our colleagues and the challenges we encounter. This is part of normal networking and professional collaboration.

Most of these conversations are, of course, completely harmless. However, the openness of such conversations can be exploited by someone whose intentions are very different. Small details can reveal a great deal about an organisation’s operations, decision-making, challenges and potential vulnerabilities.

Ordinary questions can reveal more than you think

Elicitation means obtaining information through conversation without asking direct or clearly sensitive questions. The conversation may feel entirely ordinary, even if the other party has a specific intelligence objective. For example, a person may ask you to confirm something that appears to be generally known, deliberately make an incorrect statement or show interest in a subject you know well. In such a situation, the other person may unintentionally fill in the gaps, correct the false statement or share more information about the topic.

The conversation may include questions about the systems an organisation uses, the progress of a project, delays in deliveries or the people responsible for decisions. These are ordinary work-related matters that people often discuss without giving them much thought.

In human intelligence, a relationship can be built gradually. The more familiar another person becomes, the more natural it feels to talk with them about work-related matters as well. Over time, conversations may also move from general topics to more specific questions. Trust makes information gathering more effective, because questions from someone familiar may not be treated in the same way as questions from a complete stranger.

Valuable information does not have to be classified

Ordinary work-related information can also be valuable to an outsider. An organisation consists of people, technology, suppliers, processes and the dependencies between them. When these connections are understood, potential weaknesses and entry points can also be identified.

Valuable information may include, for example:

People with key responsibilities or broad access rights
Suppliers, systems and technical platforms
Internal challenges, delays or organisational changes
Upcoming projects, procurements and recruitment plans
How decisions are made and who influences them
Ways of working, travel habits and operational routines

None of this information necessarily needs to be confidential. Combined, however, it can support intelligence gathering, social engineering or preparations for a cyberattack.

LinkedIn is also a map of your organisation

On LinkedIn, we share information about our roles, projects and career moves, while companies publish information about partnerships, recruitment and business initiatives. When someone already knows your role, your colleagues and your organisation’s current priorities, it becomes easier for them to approach you in a credible way.

LinkedIn and building new professional relationships are part of normal working life. At the same time, it is worth considering what information you share publicly about yourself and your organisation.

Awareness without paranoia

A good security culture does not restrict normal conversation or networking. If someone repeatedly shows unusual interest in the organisation’s operations or work-related matters, it is worth paying attention. Employees do not need to determine for themselves what is behind that interest. If a situation feels unusual, it should be reported to the person responsible for organisational security or through the agreed reporting channel.

Questions worth considering:

Why does this person need this information?
Are these questions justified by their role and the situation?
Are they trying to get me to confirm or correct information?
Has the relationship gradually become more personal, or have the questions become increasingly detailed?
Do I know who to contact if something does not feel right?

How organisations can strengthen their resilience

Technical controls are necessary, but they do not solve the whole problem. When people become a route to information, security must also focus on people.

Organisations can strengthen their resilience in the following ways:

Make training practical

General instructions such as “be careful” are difficult to apply in real life. Use examples from conferences, recruitment processes, social media, customer meetings and other situations that employees encounter regularly.

Explain the value of small pieces of information

Employees need to understand that security risks are not limited to classified documents. Even seemingly harmless information can become sensitive when it is combined with other information.

Create clear reporting channels

Employees should know exactly who to contact if something feels unusual. Reporting should be easy, and people should not feel that they need to prove the existence of a real threat before raising the issue.

Involve the entire organisation

Security awareness should not be limited to management or employees who have undergone security vetting. Reception staff, HR professionals, procurement teams, communications, sales, IT and external consultants may all encounter people who are trying to obtain information.

Treat awareness as ongoing work

One annual training session is rarely enough. Security awareness must remain part of everyday work through continuous dialogue, practical exercises and established ways of working.

Detection is part of security

Organisational security is not only the responsibility of the security team. Every employee sees things in their work that technical systems do not see. That is why employees’ observations are an important part of organisational security. A security culture works when people feel able to report unusual situations and when there is a clear way to handle them.

Espionage does not always begin dramatically. Sometimes, an ordinary conversation and a few well-chosen questions are enough.